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NOTES AND COMMENT
ADMISSIBILITY OF BOOK ENTRIES AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE
Under certain circumstances a litigant may offer the books kept
and prepared by him or others as proof of the facts contained therein.
Such declarations, though hearsay, are admissible as an exception
to the hearsay evidence rule on the ground of necessity and because
records made in the regular course of business carry some guaran-
tee of trustworthiness. The exception embraces two classes of book
entries :
1. Shop book entries, which are made in the books of the parties
to the action by the parties themselves;
2. Entries made in the regular course of business by those not
parties to the action.
New York Common Law
The shop book rule was adopted to permit small shop keepers,
who ran an individual enterprise to prove their cases in court against
their customers. To aid this type of shop keeper in his proof this
rule was adopted permitting him to put his books in evidence pro-
vided that:
1. The party kept no clerk;
2. Some of the articles charged had been delivered, or some of
the services charged had been performed;
3. The books produced were the account books of the party;
4. He had kept fair and honest accounts as testified to by those
who had dealt and settled with him.1
The rule as to entries made in the regular course of business
permits the admission into evidence of books prepared by persons
other than the litigants and was designed to serve the needs of larger
enterprises where record clerks were employed. To permit book
entries to be introduced in evidence under this rule it must appear
that the entries were made:
1. In the regular course of business;
2. By one in the discharge of his duty or in the regular course
of his employment or business;
1Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 Johns. 461 (N. Y. 1815).
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3. At or reasonably near the time when the recorded transaction
or event occurred;
4. By one who had personal knowledge of the facts recorded, or
to whom the information was communicated by some one who
had such personal knowledge and whose duty. it was to make
such report to the entrant.2
New York Statute
Because of the difficulty inherent in complying with this prelim-
inary proof, the recommendations of the Legal Research Committee
of the Commonwealth Fund were enacted in full by the New York
State Legislature, in Section 374-a of the Civil Practice Act.3 The
statute was intended to secure a more workable rule of evidence in
the proof of business transactions under existing business conditions. 4
The New York statute provides:
Admissibility of certain written records. Any writing or record, whether in
the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record
of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in
proof of said act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find
that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the
regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the
time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time
thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record.
including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown
to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term
"business" shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of every
kind.
As the section is written, it would appear that the following proof is
now required:
1. That the entry was made in the regular course of business;
2. That it was in the regular course of business to make such
entry; and
3. That the memorandum or record was made at the time of the
transaction, occurrence, or event, or within a reasonable time
thereafter.5
The first case involving the interpretation of the statute to come
before the Court of Appeals was the important case of Johnson v.
2 Mayor v. Second Avenue R. R., 102 N. Y. 572, 7 N. E. 905 (1886).
3 L. 1928, c. 532.
4 Shea v. McKeon, 264 App. Div. 573, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 962 (1st Dep't1942).1 Publishers' Book Bindery, Inc. v. "Harry" Ziegelheim, N. Y. L. J., May
3, 1945, p. 1679, col. 4.
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Lutz.6 In that case a police blotter containing the report of a police-
man who did not see the accident, but who based his report upon
hearsay statements of third persons, was held inadmissible. The
court said: "The memorandum in question was not made in the
regular course of any -business, profession, occupation or calling."
Although not necessary to the decision, the court stated that the
statute was not intended to permit the receipt in evidence of entries
based upon voluntary hearsay statements made by third parties not
engaged in the business or under any duty in relation thereto. Much
confusion resulted from the dicta in this case, but under the statute
as interpreted by the courts, the test still is "was the entry made in
the regular course of business, was it in the regular course of busi-
ness to make such entry and was the entry made at the time of
the transaction, occurrence, or event, or within a reasonable time
thereafter ?"
The Appellate Division in Geroeami v. Fancy Fruit and Produce
Corp.7 held that the admission in evidence of a hospital record to
the effect that plaintiff, in an action for injuries suffered when struck
by an automobile truck, was intoxicated at the time of the accident,
is incompetent. From the decision in the Geroeami case and that
in a later opinion of the Appellate Division in the Roberto v. Nielson
case,8 it is apparent that the difficulty facing the courts in deciding
on the admissibility of hospital records is that it is the business of
those connected with hospitals to make some ascertainment of the
facts bearing upon the nature of the injuries which the patient has
sustained to guide doctors in their diagnosis and treatment. In the
Roberto case, which was an action for personal injuries resulting
from an automobile accident, the hospital records were held admis-
sible except for the portion reading "but evidently, after a day of
beer and wine drinking, he was somehow involved in an auto acci-
dent!' The Court of Appeals in People v. Kohlmeyer 9 held that
hospital records containing the diagnosis made by a doctor were ad-
missible. The court in holding that hospital records are included
under Section 374-a stated that "it was error, therefore, to exclude,
from evidence, the parts of the hospital records which were not hear-
say." 10 The court also held that any portion of the hospital record
or death certificate is admissible including the history portion of the
hospital record or the cause of the death stated in the death certifi-
cate, if the person who made the entry in the hospital record or
death certificate could testify to the entry he made if called personally
6253 N. Y. 124, 170 N. E. 517 (1930).
7249 App. Div. 221, 291 N. Y. Supp. 837 (1st Dep't 1936).
8 262 App. Div. 1035, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 334 (2d Dep't 1941).
9284 N. Y. 366, 31 N. E. (2d) 490 (1940).
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to the witness stand. Pursuant to this rule the cases uniformly hold
that the admissibility of the history portion of the hospital record
depends upon whether the plaintiff gave the history or not. Where
the history is given by the plaintiff the person making the entry
could testify to it if called to the stand; if it is not given by the
plaintiff, he could not."
In Del Re v. City of New, York,'2 an action for injury to a pass-
enger riding on a subway, the Appellate Term held that the hospital
record, reading "patient was riding in a subway when it came to a
sudden stop" was inadmissible as hearsay on the vital issue in the
case. The decision was based upon the ground that "it was the
business of the hospital to diagnose the patient's condition and to treat
him, not to record a statement derived from an unidentified source
describing the manner in which the patient's injuries were sus-
tained." This decision is sound, for it is not the business of a hos-
pital to make a record of the manner in which accidents occur. The
influence of the dicta in the Johnson v. Lutz 13 case is apparent for
it is submitted that under Section 374-a it would have made no differ-
ence whether or not the identity of the source is established or whether
the source was the patient himself.
The report of the Legal Research Committee of the Common-
wealth Fund, "The Law of Evidence-Some Proposals for Its Re-
form," published in 1927 by the Yale University Press, dealt with
the question of book entries under the heading of "Proof of Business
Transactions to Harmonize with Current Business Practice." It
explained and illustrated the great need of a more "practical, work-
able and uniform rule, adapted to modem business conditions and
practices." The report is devoted to a discussion of the pressing need
of a rule of evidence which would "give evidential credit to the books
upon which the mercantile and industrial world relies in the conduct
of business." The statute as interpreted by the courts has been ap-
plied in a variety of situations. It has been held proper to admit,
under this section, a ledger containing business entries, in an action
for the agreed price and reasonable value of goods ;14 the minute
and cash books of a congregation, in an action to impress a trust upon
3o Italics added. A great deal of confusion has resulted from the use of
the word hearsay. It seems that the courts, in certain instances, regard hearsay
made admissible for one reason or another, as no longer hearsay, as in the
Kohlmeyer case, cited supra note 9.
"I N. Y. L. J., April 24, 1945, p. 1548, col. 1.
12 180 Misc. 525, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 825 (1943).
13 See note 6 supra.
4 Warner Quinlan Co. v. Ben Charat, Inc., 143 Misc. 443, 257 N. Y. Supp.
722 (1932).
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money deposited with the congregation ;15 the ledger and monthly
statements prepared by plaintiff's agent who managed the property,
in an acton to recover rent ;16 corporate books as prima facie evidence
of the correctness of the assets and liabilities of the corporation, in a
proceeding for a judicial settlement of the accounts of an administra-
trix.17 Once the proper foundation has been laid the records should
be treated as original evidence and should be weighed like all other
evidence.' 8
Federal Statute
In 1936 Congress enacted a statute,1 9 which is substantially the
same in form and content as the Civil Practice Act § 374-a. The
Unifed States Supreme Court was first called to pass upon the scope
of the federal statute in Palmer v. Hoffnan.2 0 The Court took the
position that legislation that tends to liberalize the admission of hear-
say evidence is to be strictly construed. In that case, plaintiff sued
to recover damages for injuries arising out of a grade-crossing acci-
dent. Two days after the accident, as required by the defendant
railroad company's rules, the engineer of the train involved reported
the circumstances of the accident to an official of the company. The
engineer having died before trial, the railroad offered his statement
in evidence, contending that it was made in the regular course of
business, and therefore was admissible by virtue of the statute. The
trial court excluded the statement. The Supreme Court affirmed,
saying, "But we do not think that the statement was made 'in the
regular course' of business within the meaning of the Act. The busi-
ness of the petitioner is the railroad business. That business like
25 Zinaman v. Stivelman, 246 App. Div. 851, 285 N. Y. Supp. 20, aff'd,
272 N. Y. 580, 4 N. E. (2d) 813 (1936).
16 Funk v. Modo Lora Realty, Inc., 145 Misc. 805, 260 N. Y. Supp. 844
(1932).
17 Matter of Auditore's Estate, 136 Misc. 664, 240 N. Y. Supp. 502 (1930).
18 See note 14 sapra.
19 Act of June 20, 1936, c. 640, § 1, 49 STAT. 1561, 28 U. S. C. A. 685,
provides: "In any court of the United States and in any court established by
Act of Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a
book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction,
occurrence or evcnt, shall be admissible as evidence of said act, transaction,
occurrence, or event, if it shall appear that it was made in the regular course
of any business, and that it was in the regular course of such business to make
such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence,
or event within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the
making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the
entrant or maker may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect
its admissibility. The term 'business' shall include business, profession, occu-
pation, and calling of every kind."
20 318 U. S. 109, 63 Sup. Ct. 477, 87 L. ed. 645 (1943).
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other enterprises entails the keeping of numerous books and records
essential to its conduct or useful in its efficient operation . . . The
engineer's statement which was held inadmissible in this case falls
into quite a different category. It's not a record made for the system-
atic conduct of the business as a business." In brief, the Court ruled
that, within the contemplation of the statute, the business of a rail-
road is railroading and not causing accidents. The decision of the
Court is sound in principle for it is a reaffirmance of the Common-
wealth Fund proposal. As Professor Maguire stated in a note in
the Harvard Law Review,21 "The majority opinion in the Hoffman
case quite correctly emphasizes the morbid judicial fear of deliberate
falsification expressed by the early English formulations of the hear-
say rule and its exceptions. Correctly again, the opinion speaks of
the judicial effort to indicate guaranties of trustworthiness connected
with the documents admitted as business entries.. ."
FLORENCE BECKER,
HAROLD F. McNIECE.
TAX AVOIDANCE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Tax avoidance, customarily associated with private firms and
individuals, is applied on by far the largest scale of all-by our own
Federal Government. This is not to imply, however, that the Gov-
ernment has thereby breached any ethical standards, for it is now
well recognized that despite the evils which result from the promis-
cuous application of dubious tax reduction practices, the use of sound
legal principles for reducing taxes is "above reproach" 1 and not even
"mildly unethical". 2
Since 1819, when Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Mary-
land 3 expounded the principle that the Constitution of the United
States implies that properties, functions, and instrumentalities of the
Federal Government are immune from taxation by its constituent
parts, the Government has attempted to obtain the maximum pos-
sible exemption from all state and local taxes.
However, although the doctrine of implied immunity appeared
to be clear when applied to direct taxes levied on the Government,
its precise reach became obscure when applied to indirect taxes.
21 (1942) 56 HARV. L. REv. 464.
'See PAUL, STUDIES ix FEDERAL TAXATION (1937) 85.2 Rands, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 1094.
3 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
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